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DO WE NEED TO SECURE A PLACE AT THE TABLE FOR
WOMEN? AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGALITY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW SB-826
Teal N. Trujillo†
INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2018, close to 20,000 Google employees marched out of offices
in fifty different cities as part of a global protest against gender inequality in the
workplace.1 This event was ignited by the recent disclosure that Google had paid a
$90 million exit package to Andy Rubin, creator of the Android operating system,
following a merited sexual harassment claim. 2 But tensions have been rising in
Silicon Valley for years.3 From San Francisco to Google’s headquarters in Mountain
View, California, protestors bellowed, “This doesn’t end today” and “Time is up in
Tech. Time is up at Google.”4 Protestors invoked the “Time’s Up” language of the
#MeToo Movement, which unearthed numerous prolonged scandals of sexual
misconduct in nearly every industry over the past year. The movement sent
shockwaves throughout the country. 5 Protestors in California were making a

†J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.A., Saint Louis University, 2016. I would like to thank
the members of the Journal of Legislation for their diligent editing and support in writing this article. Most
importantly, I would like to thank all the strong women in my life, especially my mother, my Nana Phyllis Kime
and my Grandma Nico Trujillo.
1 See Jillian D’Onfro, Google Walkouts Showed What the New Tech Resistance Looks Like, with Lots of
Cues from Union Organizing, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2018, 1:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/03/googleemployee-protests-as-part-of-new-tech-resistance.html.
2 See Kate Conger & Inyoung Kang, California Today: Google Employees Around the World Walk Out,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/us/california-today-googleprotest.html.
3 See generally Google Reveals 48 Employees Fired for Sexual Harassment, AP NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/06bbde4e7ba449089a62d8d351ecbe8c (attempting to combat rumors of large exit
severance packages given to male executives accused of sexual harassment, Google reveals forty-eight men
were fired over the past two years with nothing, no compensation packages).
4 D’Onfro, supra note 1.
5 See generally Stephanie Zacharek et al., Time Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Nov.
4, 2018, 5:23 PM), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/.
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statement to the entire tech community, where women face exclusion on the outskirts
of boy’s club dynamics6 and are notably underrepresented.7
Google, a company that is only 31% female, was confronted with a call for
“transparency, accountability and structural change” as written by the protest
organizers on an internal Google site.8 The demands went beyond better handling of
sexual harassment claims and were a petition for basic fairness among sexes in the
workplace.9 The demands alluded to the unequal treatment of women at Google, a
side effect of the male-dominated environment. In 2017, Pew Research Center found
that 37% of women working in a majority-male workplace felt they had been treated
as if they were not competent because of their gender at some point.10 They were also
much more likely to have experienced small slights in the workplace as opposed to
majority-female or mixed group workplaces.
The lack of female representation in executive positions compounds the problem.
Equal treatment in the workplace starts from the top down. Looking at the big picture,
it may seem that women are succeeding on this front, as the number of women
holding chief executive positions nearly doubled from 2007 to 2017.11 However, that
was an increase from just 2.8% to 5.4%.12 By 2017, only twenty-seven companies in
the benchmark S&P 500 stock index had female CEOs.13 Currently, women hold a
very small number of top executive positions in U.S. corporations.
One solution suggested to this problem is to mandate the presence of women on
corporate boards. California has become the first state to enact a quota for the number
of women that must serve on qualifying corporations’ board of directors. 14 On
September 30, 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 826 (“SB-826”) into
6 Kim Parker, Women in Majority-Male Workplaces Report Higher Rates of Gender Discrimination, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 6, 2018 4:30 PM), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/women-inmajority-male-workplaces-report-higher-rates-of-gender-discrimination/ (explaining 49% of women in maledominated industries said sexual harassment was a problem in their workplaces, compared to 32% of women
whose workplaces had more women than men).
7 Brooke E. Dresden et al., Male-Dominated No Girls Allowed: Women in Male-Dominated Majors
Experience Increased Gender Harassment and Bias, 121 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 459, 460 (2018) (“14% of
women who graduate with an engineering degree never enter the workforce, and a significant portion cite the
‘engineering culture’ as their main reason for leaving” and “[o]ne factor that may influence the perceived
negative ‘engineering culture’ is sexual harassment”).
8 Conger, supra note 2.
9 Id. The protestors had five specific demands allegedly including, “an end to forced arbitration of sexual
harassment and assault, increased transparency about compensation and the appointment of an employee
representative to the company’s board.” Id.
10 Parker, supra note 6.
11 Drew Desilver, Few Women Lead Large U.S. Companies, Despite Modest Gains Over Past Decade,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/26/few-women-leadlarge-u-s-companies-despite-modest-gains-over-past-decade/ (“In 2017, 27 companies in the S&P 500 (or 5.4%)
had women CEOs, up from 14 (2.8%) in 2007.”).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See Vanessa Furhmans, California Becomes First State to Mandate Female Board Directors, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 30, 2018 6:13 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-moves-to-mandate-female-boarddirectors-1535571904?mod=article_inline.
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law, requiring all publicly traded companies with principal executive offices in
California to have at least one woman on their board of directors by 2019.15 In the
three years following, depending on the size of the board, companies would also need
to hire another one to two females directors.16 The goal being that boards would end
up with a makeup that is at least 40% female. Corporate boards that do not comply
face financial penalty.17
Though the bill passed with high percentages in both the Assembly and Senate,
it has fostered strong opposition. Multiple business groups including the California
Chamber of Commerce opposed the mandate as violating the United States and
California constitutions, as it could result in adverse treatment based on merely one
element of diversity: gender. 18 Additionally, there are constitutional challenges
regarding enforcement as few companies have both their principal offices and are
doing a majority of their business in California.19 Regardless of the complexities
surrounding the enforcement of SB-826, the disparity of women in executive
positions is a significant issue.
This Note will delve into the particulars of California SB-826 to determine its
legality and to examine available alternatives to accomplish its goal: to encourage
equitable gender representation on corporate boards. Part I of this Note will discuss
the requirements of SB-826 and the purpose behind the law including the legislature’s
intent. Part II will provide an examination of possible legal challenges that could be
brought against the law. This Part will argue that SB-826 could not survive a
constitutional challenge but should be salvaged due to the necessity of the bill.
Finally, Part III will address alternative ways California could accomplish similar
objectives proposed in SB-826 while still complying with both the state and national
constitution.
I. UNDERSTANDING SENATE BILL 826
SB-826 is not California s first attempt at creating gender quotas, but the product
of a continued commitment to the problem of underrepresentation of women in
executive positions. On September 12, 2013, the California State Senate passed
Concurrent Resolution Number 62 (“SCR-62”), a measure to encourage equitable and
diverse gender representation on corporate boards.20 The Resolution was authored
by Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson and sponsored by the National Association of

S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013).
Furhmans, supra note 14.
17 Id
18 Id.
The California Chamber of Commerce argues the mandate violated the U.S. and California
constitutions because it could put companies in the position of displacing men seeking to serve on boards. Id.
19 Id.
20 S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013).
15
16

Journal of Legislation

327

Women Business Owners California (“NAWBO-CA”). 21 This measure was the
brain-child of what would become SB-826, imposing extremely similar quotas.22 It
relied upon multiple studies citing increased financial success and improved
corporate culture among boards that include women.23 The difference was that the
Resolution was non-binding and had no legally enforceable consequences for
violations of its terms. California became the first state in the country to make an
effort to define board diversity by taking such a stance.24 The passing of SCR-62 set
a precedent for other states who then passed initiatives with the same goals.25 The
following subparts will now discuss how the California State Senate built upon the
framework created by SCR-62 to pass the current legislation.
A. REQUIREMENTS OF CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 826
Five years after the SCR-62 initiative, California passed a binding piece of
legislation regarding gender representation on corporate boards. Senate Bill 826, also
authored by Senator Jackson, is an Act adding §§ 301.3 and 2115.5 to the California
Corporation Code. Section 301.3(a) states that by the close of the year 2019 any
publicly held domestic or foreign corporation with principal executive offices in
California shall have a female director on its board.26 The section goes on to make
cumulative mandates through the year 2021:
(b) No later than the close of the 2021 calendar year, a publicly held
domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive offices,
according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in
California shall comply with the following:
(1)
If its number of directors is six or more, the corporation
shall have a minimum of three female directors.
21 See Jackson Bill to Make California the First State to Require Women on Corporate Boards Heads to
the Governor, CALIFORNIA SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://sd19.senate.ca.gov/news/201808-30-jackson-bill-make-california-first-state-require-women-corporate-boards-heads.
22 S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013). The relevant portion of SCR-62 text:
(“[W]ithin a 3-year period from January 2014 to December 2016, inclusive, every publicly held
corporation in California with 9 or more director seats have a minimum of 3 women on its board, every publicly
held corporation in California with 5 to 8 director seats have a minimum of 2 women on its board, and every
publicly held corporation in California with 5 to 8 director seats have a minimum of one woman on its board.”).
23 S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013). (“A McKinsey and Company study entitled ‘Women
Matter’ showed that companies where women are strongly represented at board or top management levels are
also the companies that perform best.” “An Oklahoma State University study found that board diversity,
including gender gender and ethnicity, is associated with improved financial value.”)
24 See Melissa Breuer, Note, Next Stop for Diversity Initiatives: Corporate Boardrooms, 42 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 223, 226 (2016).
25 Id. (“On May 31, 2015, the Illinois House of Representatives passed HR 439, and on July 29, 2015, the
Massachusetts Senate passed S1007. Each of these resolutions seeks to accomplish the same set of goals that
CA SCR-62 was established to achieve.”).
26 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 954 (SB-826) (current version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3).
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(2)
If its number of directors is five, the corporation shall
have a minimum of two female directors.
(3)
If its number of directors is four or fewer, the corporation
shall have a minimum of one female director.27
For purposes of this mandate, a publicly held corporation is defined as a corporation
with outstanding shares listed on a major United States stock exchange.28 Among the
Russell 3000 Index, a listing of such companies, 485 corporations or 17% of the total
companies had all-male boards in the second quarter of 2017.29 Eighty-six of these
companies are headquartered in California, including brand names like Sketches USA
Inc. and TiVo Corp.30 Further, the plain language of the law reads that it shall be
binding upon any corporation whose principal executive offices, according to the
corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in California.31 Therefore, the law applies
where: (1) the corporation’s outstanding shares are listed on a major United States
stock exchange and (2) the principal executive offices in accordance with the United
States Securities Exchange Commission Form 10-K are located in California.
Turning back to the core requirements of the measure, additional consideration
should be given to how the bill has chosen to define female and the restrictions or
lack thereof placed on corporate board seats. As to the former, female is defined as
an individual ho self-identifies her gender as a woman, without regard to the
individual’s designated sex at birth.32 The bill does not require a quota of the female
sex. It is a mandate based on gender. Consequently, the bill is inclusive of
transsexuals or all other persons self-identifying as female. This definition could be
an intentional effort to circumvent the argument that the law is beneficial toward only
one protected class of persons, people of the female sex. And so, the bill is technically
not a bar to persons of the male sex. It is also a testament to the progressive ideals
held by modern culture. The second interesting facet of the law is that it does not cap
the number of seats a corporate board could have. For current boards that are
predominately male, the law is not requiring that male board members be removed
from their seats in order to be in compliance.33 There is no prohibition on the addition

Id.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(f)(2) (West 2018).
29 See Vanessa Fuhrmans and Alejandro Lazo, California Moves to Mandate Female Board Directors,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2018 10:06 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-moves-to-mandate-femaleboard-directors-1535571904?mod=article_inline.
30 Id.
31 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018).
32 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(f)(1) (West 2018).
33 See Teresa L. Johnson, Hurdles Ahead For California’s Female Director Mandate, ARNOLD & PORTER
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/10/hurdles-ahead-for-casfemale-director-mandate.
27
28
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of extra board seats to comport with the mandate. These two aspects of the law bolster
the argument that the law is constitutional.
The final requirement, and most striking distinction between the bill and the
previous resolution, SCR-62, is the inclusion of sanctions. There are now financial
penalties enforceable upon public corporations who do not comply with the mandate.
According to Section 301.3(e)(1), a first violation is punished by a $100,000 fine, and
a second violation by a $300,000 fine.34 There is another $100,000 fine for “failure
to timely file board member information with the Secretary of State.” 35 Part of
complying with SB-826 requires disclosure to the State. Section 301.3(d) reads by
the year 2020 “and annually thereafter,” the bill necessitates a report be published
online by the Secretary of State recording the number of corporations subject to this
section that were in compliance, the number of new corporations that will need to be
in compliance, and the number of corporations that will no longer have to comply.36
Thus, in order to formulate this report, corporations must inform the Secretary of
State of their submission to the bill or else face an additional $100,000 fine.
The law makes no mention of a corporation’s place of incorporation, only the
location of “principal executive offices.”37 There is a question, though, as to whether
the mandate is applicable to companies incorporated elsewhere. Corporate case law
has established a rule that in disputes involving a corporation and its relationships
with shareholders, officers or agents, the law to be applied is the law of the state of
incorporation”, commonly known as the internal-affairs doctrine.38 Critics of the law
suggest the conflict with this doctrine will be the Achilles heel of the legislation.
Moreover, if the legislation were enforced only against corporations incorporated
within California, that would significantly reduce the number of corporations

CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1) (West 2018).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1)(A) (West 2018).
36 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2018). The relevant portion of text of California Senate Bill No. 826:
(c) No later than July 1, 2019, the Secretary of State shall have published a report
on its Internet Web site documenting the number of domestic and foreign corporations
whose principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are
located in California and who have at least one female director.
34
35

(d) No later than March 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
publish a report on its Internet Web site regarding, at a minimum, all of the following:
(1) The number of corporations subject to this section that were incompliance
with the requirements of this section during at least one point during the preceding
calendar year.
(2) The number of publicly held corporations that moved their United States
headquarters to California from another state or out of California into another state
during the preceding calendar year.
(3) The number of publicly held corporations that were subject to this section
during the preceding year, but are no longer publicly traded.
S. 826, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018).
37 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018).
38 Internal-Affairs Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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affected. Notably, 80% of the Russell 3000 Index companies housed in California
are incorporated in Delaware.39
Supporters of the law point to Section 2115.5 and argue by analogy that the
mandate applies to publicly held corporations incorporated outside California.
Section 2115.5 is an addition to the state Corporations Code that attempts to make all
components of Section 301.3 also applicable to foreign corporations. 40 Section
2115.5(a) states that the bill “shall apply … to the exclusion of la of the jurisdiction
in which the foreign corporation is incorporated.” 41 Thus, the provision seeks to
preempt the law of the place of incorporation also for any “foreign corporation with
outstanding shares listed on a major United States stock exchange.”42 The parallel to
treatment of foreign corporations is not especially strong.43 This interpretation may
be an overreach of the California state government, which will be discussed more
thoroughly later in this Note.
However, even if the mandate were to be stringently enforced, making SB-826
applicable only to corporations both headquartered and incorporated in California,
the impact would still be significant. Nearly 100 companies would still be affected if
SB-826 goes into enforcement under that interpretation. The resulting impact would
be that 684 women will have to be hired by the year 2021 to corporate boards in order
to comply with the new law. 44 This would still create enormous opportunity for
women and be a step towards ending the gender disparity in greater haste than would
come about naturally.
SB-826 requires all publicly traded corporations whose principal executive
offices are in California and have outstanding shares on a major United States stock
exchange to have at least one female on their board of directors by the year 2019.
Then, depending on the size of the board, they must add an additional one to two
female directors by the year 2021. Accompanying these appointments, the
corporation must timely file annual board information updates with the Secretary of
State. If the disclosures are not complied with or the quotas of female directors not
met, the corporation could face fines totaling $300,000 or more.
B. THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 826
39 See Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Bill Requiring California Corporate Boards to Include
Women, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018 4:00 PM) http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-governorwomen-corporate-boards-20180930-story.html
40 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(a) (West 2018).
41 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(a) (West 2018).
42 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(b) (West 2018).
43 See Keith Paul Bishop, Why California’s Gender Quota Bill is More Likely to be Unconstitutional Than
California’s Pseudo- Foreign Corporations Act , THE NAT’L. L. REV.
(Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/why-california-s-gender-quota-bill-more-likely-to-be-unconstitutionalcalifornia-s (discussing the California Corporations Code § 2115.5 and how the Delaware Supreme Court has
refused to give it effect).
44 McGreevy, supra note 39. (“If the law survives legal challenge, 684 women will need to fill board seats
for Russell 3000 companies by 2021.”)
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Effective legislation is not only about the requirements, but how effectively
those means effectuate the ends or the purpose of the law. This involves looking at
the motivation and legislative intent behind SB-826. Here, we can look to the
commentary of its author and the wording of the bill itself to decipher the mandate’s
purpose. Senator Hannah Beth-Jackson was the author of SRC-62 in 2013, urging an
increase in the number of women on corporate boards of directors toward the same
quotas currently required by SB-826. 45 Senator Beth-Jackson found that by
December 31, 2016, less than 20% of the Russell 3000 Index companies covered had
appointed the minimum number of female directors proposed by the resolution within
the three-year cut-off period.46 Thus, in 2017, Senator Jackson authored the current
bill in the interest of creating a binding quota. Her motivation stems from the fact
that “[o]ne-fourth of California s publicly traded companies still do not have a single
woman on their board.”47 Though liberal-leaning, California lags behind the national
average of 16.2%, for the Russell 3000 Index of women serving as female directors
in public corporations, with only 15.5% of corporate board seats held by women.48
Senator Beth-Jackson has also been quoted saying, “With women comprising over
half the population and making over 70% of purchasing decisions, their insight is
critical to discussions and decisions that affect corporate culture, actions and
profitability.”49 Senator Beth-Jackson advocates that the addition of more female
directors is not only equitable, but also enhances the “performance, governance,
innovation, and opportunity” of the corporation.50
Turning to the wording of the bill itself, SB-826 cites multiple statistics that have
found corporate boards with three or more female directors more profitable.51 Such
corporations are more likely to have higher reported earnings,52 higher average return

45 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018); S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013). (“[W]ithin a
three year-period from January 2014 to December 2016, inclusive, every publicly held corporation in California
with nine or more directors seats have a minimum of three women on its board, … with five to eight director
seats have a minimum of two women on its board, and … with fewer than five director seats have a minimum
of one woman on its board.”)
46 CALIFORNIA SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, supra note 21.
47 Id.
48 See Johnson, supra note 33.
49 CALIFORNIA SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, supra note 21.
50 Id.
51 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“According to the
study entitled ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards From Tokenism to Critical Mass,’ by M. Torchia, A.
Calabro, and M. Huse, published in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2011, and report entitled ‘Critical Mass on
Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance,’ attaining critical mass … creates an
environment where women are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of
board discussions.”)
52 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3. See also editor and reviser’s notes for § 301.3, which state: “[a] 2017 study
by MSCI found that United States companies that began the five-year period from 2011 to 2016 with three or
more female directors reported earnings per share that were 45 percent higher than those companies with no
female directors at the beginning of the period.”
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on equity, 53 and better stock performance. 54 Other benefits among boards with
women directors are that they tend to be more sustainable and future-oriented. 55
There are two issues with this research. The first is that the majority of the statistics
about corporate performance used in the bill have been taken from two primary
studies: one done by MSCI Inc., a global provider of equity, stock market index, and
portfolio analysis tools; the other a long-term study by Credit Suisse Group AG, a
joint-stock company that owns Credit Suisse Bank. The MSCI study purports that
corporations, which reach a “critical mass” of women, also referred to as the “tipping
point,” had a median change in their earning per share of 37% and a ten percentage
point change on their return on equity.56 The study is limited, though, by the fact they
cannot prove a causal link between the addition of women and rise in economic
prosperity, only a correlation. 57 The study in effect minimizes their research by
stating “[a]cademic studies have tied diversity in various groups to higher levels of
creativity and better decision making.”58 Thus, a corporate board with more diversity,
not necessarily isolated to gender diversity, will have greater overall success. Second,
the Credit Suisse six-year study is a global study monitoring countries like France,
Spain, Belgium, and Germany where quotas have already been introduced.59 The
resulting research affirms that diversity delivers greater innovation and corporate
performance.60 However, in the countries that have already mandated quotas such as
Spain, for example, they are not anticipated to be in full compliance with the quota
by the required year.61 There the quota is having minimal success. Further, one of
the greatest obstacles the study cites for overcoming gender diversity is cultural
bias—a difficult variable to measure across countries.62 Though the results of the
study are limited, it is the longest existing study examining gender diversity and
corporate performance. Finally, regardless of the study’s defects, nearly all of the

53 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(2) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“In 2014, Credit
Suisse found that companies with at least one woman on their board had an average return on equity (ROE) of
12.2 percent, compares to 10.1 percent in companies with no female directors.”).
54 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(4) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“Credit Suisse
conducted a six-year global research study from 2006 to 2012, with more than 2,000 companies worldwide,
showing that women on boards improve business performance for key metrics, including stock performance.”).
55 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(3) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3 (“A 2012 University
of California, Berkley study called ‘Women Create a Sustainable Future’ found that companies with more
women on their boards are more likely to ‘create a sustainable future’ by … instituting strong governance
structures with high level of transparency.”).
56 Meggin Thwing Eastman et al., The Tipping Point: Women on Boards and Financial Performance, p.
15, MSCI ESG Research LLC (Dec. 2016), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789acee-3f9ed97ee8bb.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See generally Barbara Lejczavk, Diversity on Board!, CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-and-expertise/diveristy-on-board-201506.html.
60 Id. “As the report concludes: ‘It is not case of a greater ability of one gender versus the other but that a
more diverse group makes for better decision making and corporate performance.’” Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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statistical evidence for the bill supports the addition of women on behalf of corporate
performance, a purely economic standpoint.
This further begs the question: is the profitability of corporations a proper
purpose of state legislation? Was SB-826 driven by a lack of corporate performance?
Rather, it is important to look at the historical context from which SB-826 sprung
from. In October of 2017, Ashley Judd became the first celebrity to go on record
exposing the “open secret” that was the repeated years of sexual abuse committed by
Harvey Weinstein, filmmaker and cofounder of Miramax records, toward Hollywood
actresses. 63 No one knew this single interview would result in a deluge of
accusations, exposing sexual misconduct among beloved comedians, famous chefs
and even Supreme Court appointees.64 Sexual misconduct scandals were uncovered
in all industries. Two of the primary industries affected were the entertainment
industry and the tech industry,65 both of which have strong roots in California and
would be regulated by SB-826. The resulting conclusion is that there is a relationship
between the gender gap and sexual harassment.66 A male-dominated workforce may
give the perception that women’s voices are unwelcome and that men are in charge.67
A by-product of this type of culture can also be an increase in sexual harassment and
workplace slights such as unequal pay and opportunities for women. Therefore,
putting more women on corporate boards provides a protective barrier against
workplace oppression and promotes a more inclusive, safer environment.
In light of public history, it is unlikely that SB-826 was driven by corporate
profitability. Thus, the goals of the bill are to create an equal gender balance for top
corporate executives, improve diversity, and decrease workplace harassment. It has
been driven out of a concern for equal rights and protections. Besides corporate
performance, there are two clear reasons behind SB-826. First, without an initiative
like this to expedite the process, the United States Government Accountability Office
and similar studies estimate it will take forty years for the number of women on
corporate boards to match the number of men. 68 In effect, SB-826 will cut the
See Zacharek, et al., supra note 5.
See Charles Jones, #MeToo One Year Later: Cosby, Moonves fall, Sex Harassment Fight at Work Far
From
Over,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
4,
2018
5:21
PM
ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/04/metoo-workplace-sexual-harassment-laws-policiesprogress/1378191002/. The article discusses the conviction of comedian Bill Cosby on sex offense charges, the
resignation of chef Mario Batali who stepped down from his company after accusations of him groping multiple
women, and the accusations of sexual harassment made against, now, Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh.
63
64

65 See generally Jena McGregor, Uber, Google and the Long, Lingering Tail of #MeToo, WASH. POST (Oct.
26,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/26/uber-google-long-lingering-tailmetoo/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1bdf92e0f9a2.
66 See Vanessa Fuhrmans, What #MeToo Has to Do With the Workplace Gender Gap, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
23, 2018 4:16 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-metoo-has-to-do-with-the-workplace-gender-gap1540267680. (“[M]anagement experts and executives say, harassment can be a direct side effect of a workplace
that slights women on everything from pay to promotions, especially when the perception is that men run the
show and women can’t speak up.”)
67 Id.
68 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(f) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3.
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projected natural timeline to a fraction of the period, requiring all boards to be in
compliance within the next two years. 69 Second, the Act uses the language of
attaining a “critical mass” of women on boards. 70 The purpose of this law is to
transform the culture of boardrooms so that women no longer feel tokenized. 71
Developing a critical mass is also essential to women having enough presence and
influence that they have the ability to effectuate real change.72 SB-826 was proposed
for the purpose of making corporate boards a representative reflection of women in
the general population in a reasonable time period. This notion is also supported by
statistical evidence that boards with women on them are more successful in their
overall productivity and governance.73 The inclusive nature of such boards would
likely have an effect on decreasing the amount of workplace harassment and
increasing accountability among executives. The side effect is that this will also
increase profitability of corporations, but is that really such a terrible side effect?
Senator Jackson said it best, “[i]t’s not only the right thing to do, it’s good for a
company’s bottom line.”74
II. THE POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES AGAINST SB-826
There is no doubt that the purpose behind SB-826 is well-intentioned. However,
from its inception the bill has been opposed by over thirty business groups
challenging its legality.75 Then-Governor Jerry Brown admitted to the weakness of
the bill in his letter to the Senate.76 He was quoted as saying, “I don’t minimize the
potential flaws that indeed may prove fatal to its ultimate implementation.
Nevertheless, recent events in Washington, D.C.—and beyond—make it crystal clear
that many are not getting the message.”77 Regardless of the need for the law, the
question is whether the requirements as written could survive legal challenge. Part II
will discuss the likely grounds on which a lawsuit would be brought against SB-826.
The three most obvious attacks to be made on this bill are: (1) SB-826 is

CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3.
71 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“According to the
study entitled ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards From Tokenism to Critical Mass,’ by M. Torchia, A.
Calabro, and M. Huse, published in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2011, and report entitled ‘Critical Mass on
Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance,’ attaining critical mass … creates an
environment where women are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of
board discussions.”)
72 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(B) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3 (“Boards of
directors need to have at least three women to enable them to interact and exercise an influence on the working
style, processes, and tasks of the board, in turn positively affecting the level of organizational innovation within
the firm they govern.”).
73 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(5)(A-D) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3.
74 Antoinette Siu, California May Mandate a Woman in the Boardroom—But Businesses are Fighting It,
CALMATTERS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://calmatters.org/articles/california-women-in-boardrooms-mandate/.
75 McGreevy, supra note 36.
76 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Governor’s signing message editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3
77 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3.
69
70
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unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of California as it allows employment decisions to
be based solely on one classification of diversity; (2) SB-826 violates of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (3) SB-826 is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to corporations and is a case of
government overreach.
A. SB-826 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF U.S. AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS
The first potential lawsuit SB-826 could face is violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: “No
State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”78 The Amendment is a personal right certain to each individual. Inversely,
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one person and something
else when applied to another person of the same or different classification. 79 As
Justice Powell wrote, “[i]f both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.”80 The jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment has afforded that unequal
treatment of a person based on their membership in a protected group falls within the
scope of this amendment.81 Therefore, quotas based on a select classification have
been found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as they result in
adverse treatment of the excluded group.82 However, one exception to this has been
the proposition of affirmative action—the allowance of the consideration of race in
decision making because diversity is a compelling interest of the United States.83
Affirmative action is often associated with university admissions. The wealth of
precedent written is regarding cases about the category of race and whether that can
be considered during the application process.84 SB-826 does not fall directly within
this case law. Nonetheless, the use of a quota easily triggers the discussion of
affirmative action and could be used as the tangential rationale for why SB-826
should be struck down.
Determining what is a constitutional affirmative action plan and what is a quota
under the guise of an affirmative action has not been easy. In the landmark case on
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-290 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995).
82 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-290 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 224 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
83 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
84 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-290 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 224 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), aff’d, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016); Students
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 807 F.3d 472
(1st Cir. 2015)
78
79
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this issue, Regents University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court found the
special admissions program of the Medical School at the University of California at
Davis illegal but upheld that race may be a factor considered in selection of applicants
for admission.85 Petitioner as a white male who was rejected from the state’s medical
school.86 He then challenged the legality of the school’s special admissions program,
which reserved sixteen of the 100 positions in the program for “disadvantaged”
minority students.87 In Justice Powell’s plurality opinion, he applied the levels of
scrutiny test that originated in United States v. Carolene Products.88 Justice Powell
asserted for the first time that race and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect.
Thus, should be subject to the most exacting judicial examination—strict scrutiny.89
Practices evaluated under strict scrutiny are only justified where they further the
compelling interest of the government and are necessary to safeguarding that interest,
meaning there is no less restrictive alternative available.90 In Bakke, the use of a quota
system failed strict scrutiny because the type of diversity considered a “state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial
or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”91 Genuine diversity would
not benefit from a quota system since it is not a sustainable solution. Further, the type
of fixed percentage quota system implemented at U.C. Davis was not a necessary
means toward the end of achieving educational diversity.92
In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld a race-conscious admissions program for the
University of Michigan Law School in Grutter v. Bollinger, finding that it was
narrowly tailored.93 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to do away with any discrimination based
on race.94 Though diversity is a compelling interest, the use of racial classifications
is dangerous and should be “employed no more broadly than the interest demands.”95
The Court’s holding reflects that admissions processes like Grutter using a wide
variety of considerations will continue to pass the strict scrutiny standard.96 To be
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
Id.
87 Id.
88 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25
LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1992) (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
89 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
90 Id. at 305.
91 Id. at 315.
92 Id. at 316.
93 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
94 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–42.
95 Id. at 342.
96 Id. at 306, (finding University of Michigan Law School based their admissions decisions off “students’
academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential . . . including a
personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to the Law
School life and diversity” as well as GPA and LSAT scores. The university also looks at ‘soft variables,’ such
as recommenders’ enthusiasm, the quality of undergraduate institution and … difficulty of undergraduate course
selection”).
85
86
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considered narrowly tailored, the race-conscious admissions program cannot unduly
burden persons not in the categorization; race must be limited to a “plus” factor.97 A
narrowly tailored affirmative action program does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, the program in Grutter was not based on a fixed quota but
on enrolling a “critical mass” of minority students. 98 The concept speaks to the
“substantial, important and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce, including cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial
stereotypes.” 99 Conversely, Justice O’Connor also wrote that to “assure some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin
would be patently unconstitutional.”100 Thus, a quota would cross the line.
The aforementioned cases discussed race-conscious affirmative action programs,
not gender based programs. In Bakke, the Court did shed some light on how a genderbased cases would be treated. It determined gender would be handled with a lower
level of scrutiny intermediate scrutiny. 101 The rationale of the Court was that
“[g]ender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical
problems present in preferential programs premised on racial and ethnic criteria.”102
The Court reasoned there are only two possible classifications for gender making
class wide questions as to whether a group is being unduly burdened much more
manageable to a reviewing court.103 “Precedent shows, however, that facial quotas
would still not survive even in intermediate scrutiny, the lesser scrutiny applied to
sex-based affirmative action programs.”104
Applying these principals to SB-826, similar to Bakke, where the admission
program set aside sixteen seats strictly for minority applicants, SB-826 sets a rigid
allocation of board seats that must be occupied by women by the year 2021. The
law does use the term minimum, giving some flexibility as to the number of women
who would be sitting on the board or the possibility of expanding the number of
board seats to allow for the addition of more women. It could be argued that
because of these two omissions it is not a facial quota. However, the motivation
behind the legislation is for corporate boards to reflect women’s actual
representation in the community—40%. In light of this notion, it appears SB-826 is
fated for an unavoidable demise as an unconstitutional quota. The representation
mandated by SB-826 would not survive even intermediate scrutiny. This type of
rigid percentage is exactly what Justice O’Connor warned against.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 308.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302.
102 Id. at 302–03.
103 Id. at 303.
104 See Julia Glen, Note, Affirmative Action: The Constitutional Approach to Ending Sex Disparities on
Corporate Boards, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2089, 2110 (2017). This note cites Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 485
U.S. 718 (1982) for the proposition that a state supposed school could categorically prohibit men from being in
attendance. Id.
97
98
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But the nature of corporate boards is inherently different from that of universities.
Board directors are elected at the annual meeting of shareholders.105 One of the few
voting rights given to shareholders is their ability to elect directors. Under Delaware
General Corporation Law, shareholders must comply with particular voting rules
such as acting as a group by holding a meeting with adequate notice and quorum in
order to elect directors.106 A large corporation could have hundreds of shareholders
and a true majority is required, meaning a majority of all possible shares, in order to
elect a director. This process varies drastically from a “personal ratings” based
approach that considers a select few traits used by selection committees of
Universities. 107 That type of system results in relatively arbitrary scoring for
candidates. 108 Therefore, comparing the election of corporate directors to the
selection of students by universities is factually like comparing apples to oranges.
The only slim hope that SB-826 would survive is that the case law is too far-fetched
to be applicable.
A final consideration is that even affirmative action may no longer be considered
constitutional in a matter of years. Though the reasoning of Bakke was affirmed in
the Fisher I and II cases in 2013 and just recently in 2016,109 the forthcoming case
brought against Harvard College could upset a decades long precedent. 110 Since
Fisher, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed dramatically with the
addition of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.111 The absence of swing-vote Justice
Kennedy as well could mean the end of favorable affirmative action decisions.112
Some would argue this is long overdue stating, “[a]ffirmative action has become the
gateway drug to identity politics, or the breakup of America into antagonistic
‘oppressor’ and ‘subordinate’ groups constantly engaging in power relations.” 113
Thus, even if the current legislation could surpass the test of scrutiny and evade
designation as a quota that may not be enough.
4 Harold Marsh Jr., R. Roy Finkle & Keith Paul Bishop, Marsh’s Cal. Corp. L. §10.05 (2019).
8 DEL. CODE § 141(b) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04.
107 See Anemona Hartocollis, Does Harvard Admissions Discriminate? The Lawsuit on Affirmative Action,
Explained, THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/harvard-affirmativeaction-asian-americans.html.
108 Id.
109 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), aff’d, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016).
110 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015),
aff’d, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (refusing to intervene in Harvard’s admissions procedures and finding that
there is not a statistically significant block placed against Asian applicants to the university).
111 See Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme Court, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/us/politics/judge-kavanaugh-supreme-court-justices.html (“His
[Kavanaugh] confirmation would result in a rare replacement of the court’s swing vote justice, moving Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr.—a much more reliably conservative vote than Justice Kennedy—to the court’s
ideological center.”)
112 See generally Ariana de Vogue, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Evolution on Affirmative Action, CNN (Jun.
23, 2016, 2:21 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/politics/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-affirmativeaction/index.html; see also Yuvraj Joshi, Bakke to the Future: Affirmative Action After Fisher, 69 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 17 (2016).
113 See Mike Gonzalez, Yes, it’s Time for Affirmative Action to End—Finally, FOX NEWS (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/yes-its-time-for-affirmative-action-to-end-finally.
105
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In conclusion, SB-826 does not fit within the usual fact patterns of affirmative
action cases. The precedent cases would have to be greatly stretched to accommodate
the unique modes of election of corporate boards that differ substantially from the
application processes used in university admissions. Inversely, the abundance of
affirmative action case law sets a bright-line rule that quotas are unconstitutional
under the Equal Protections Clause. The final factor that tips the scales in favor of
SB-826 being overruled on constitutional grounds is that if it were to be brought to
the Supreme Court, the Court’s growing sentiments against any type of affirmative
action measure would likely dominate.
B. SB-826 VIOLATES TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The second potential lawsuit on which SB-826 could face a legal challenge is a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the United States
Code prohibits discrimination in employment practices on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin.114 It mandates that unlawful employment practices
shall include: “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, privileges of employment” because of an individual
membership in a protected category.115 Title VII was “aimed primarily at eradicating
employment discrimination based on race,” but by the time it was passed by Congress
it had been expanded to include other underrepresented groups, including sex.116 Sex
is construed more broadly than just male or female assignment at birth.117 Title VII
provides “affirmative action” as a remedy118 that could take the form of reinstatement,
back pay, or any such relief the court deems just and proper.119 Though affirmative
action has no special meaning, there are limitations to the methods that can be used
to promote minority employment in the workplace.120 Among these constraints, Title
VII indicates that an employer cannot “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee” based on the protected categories.121 In essence, Title VII advises against

114

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115-

334)).
115

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115-

334)).
Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L. J. 607, 611 (1998).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that Title VII barred discrimination based
on sex, for failing to act in a way that conforms to social ideals; Sex stereotyping is part of sex discrimination).
118 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5).
119 West, supra note 95.
120 Id.
121 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115334)).
116
117
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preferential treatment or any rigid percentages used to favor minority workers.122
Therefore, Title VII effectively prohibits the use of quotas.
Just one year after Bakke was decided, the Supreme Court was again faced with
a quota question but this time under the Civil Rights Act. In United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, the Supreme Court upheld a one-for-one quota for minority
workers admitted to a training program.123 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
held that Congress intended Title VII to be a “catalyst to cause employers and unions
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and … cannot be
interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action efforts…”124 United Steelworkers can be distinguished from Bakke
as it was an affirmative action plan proposed as part of a collective-bargaining
agreement.125 By its terms, the training program selected trainees based on seniority
with “the proviso that at least 50% of the trainees were to be black until the percentage
of the black skilled craftworkers approximated the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force.”126 The conclusion was that the proposed plan fell on the permissible
side of affirmative action as it aligned with the purpose and intent of Title VII.127 As
Justice Brennan keenly pointed out, “the plan is a temporary measure, not intended
to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.”128
United Steel Workers is just one in a string of cases that have muddied the stance on
the legality of quotas. It was not until 2009 that a definitive answer was given.
In Ricci v. Destefano, the Supreme Court clearly stated that employment law
rarely permits quotas.129 This case, like the previous cases, was also in the context of
racial discrimination. In Ricci, a group of white firefighters and one Hispanic
firefighter sued the City of New Haven because, though they passed examination,
they were denied the chance at promotion as the City refused to certify the results of
the exam.130 The results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority
candidates. After inciting protest, the City decided to throw out the examinations to

122

42 U.SC.A. § 2000e-2(j) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-426). The relevant portion of Title VII

states:
Nothing contained in this [subchapter] shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor management committee . . . to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons. . . in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in any community, State, section or other area . . .
Id.
United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979).
Id. at 204 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)) (quotations omitted).
125 Id. at 193.
126 Id. at 199.
127 Id. at 195.
128 Id. at 208.
129 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
130 Id.
123
124
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avoid a lawsuit based on the statistical disparity.131 Nevertheless, this discrimination
lawsuit still ensued by the converse parties. The City explained that it was caught in
a catch-22: if it certified the test results they would face liability under Title VII for
adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on minority firefighters. Writing for
a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[w]ithout some other justification, this
express, race-based decision-making violates Title VII’s command that employers
cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.” 132 He
acknowledged that no matter how well intentioned the actions were, the employment
decision was based on the member’s status in a protected category—bluntly, that too
many whites and not enough minorities passed the test.133 Justice Kennedy reasoned
that allowing this disparate treatment based on a good faith fear of committing
disparate treatment could turn into an unwarranted focus on statistics134 and, worst of
all, a quota system.135 Justice Kennedy feared a quota system based subjectively on
employer ideals, but the opinion clearly expressed its distaste for quotas.
To further complicate the issue, the plaintiffs in Ricci v. Destefano also
brought a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.136 It
was determined that the discarding of the tests was a violation of Title VII, so the
Court never reached the issue of equal protection.137 The Court did briefly recognize
the tension between “elimination segregation” that allows affirmative action as a
remedial program under the Equal Protection Clause and disparate treatment under
Title VII. 138 Justice Scalia was the only one to directly address the issue in his
concurrence. He wisely wrote, “the war between disparate impact and equal
protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about
how and on what terms to make peace between them.”139 Even if SB-826 were able
to survive a claim brought on grounds of equal protection that is not to say it would
be found legal under Title VII. The bill is demanding that corporate board decisions
be made based on membership in a protected category. There are numerous scenarios
that could be conceived where a man would face disparate treatment in attempting to
meet the mandated number of female board directors. Additionally, gender is only
one categorization in creating true diversity.

Id.
Id. at 579.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 581.
135 Id. at 582 (“[e]ven worse, an employer could discard test results (or other employment practices) with
the intent of obtaining the employers preferred racial balance”).
136 Id. at 576.
137 Id. at 563.
138 Id. at 582–583.
139 Id. at 595–96; see also Abigail Thernstrom, The Supreme Court Says No to Quotas, WALL ST. J. (July
1, 2009 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124640586803076705.
131
132
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Moreover, there is no description of how applicants will be evaluated under
SB-826 or what other qualifications would be in consideration. It could be argued
that this law falls within the parameters of United Steel Workers.140 Currently, only
15.5% of corporate board seats are held by women and one-fourth of California’s
public companies in the Russell 3000 index have no women serving as directors, yet
women represent half of the population.141 Under United Steel Workers, it could be
considered a “manifest […] imbalance” if the number of qualified women on
corporate boards is so strikingly unjust in comparison to the actual population.142
However, this law is not a self-imposed affirmative action plan of a private company;
SB-826 is a government-imposed requirement. Being a woman is the dispositive
factor in this gender-conscious law. There is also no mention that this law is
temporary like the one at issue in United Steel Workers. Instead, SB-826 is more
closely aligned with Ricci, where the actions were well intentioned but still resulted
in an act of disparate treatment. There are possible scenarios where the consequences
of this law would prevent men from being hired, causing preferential treatment to
persons not in the classified category solely based on their membership. This type of
preferential treatment was held to be facially unconstitutional.143
Critically, the most important question not yet discussed is whether there is
coverage. Can corporate board directors even be held liable under Title VII? SB826 defines “employee” broadly as any individual employed by an employer, not
including those elected to public office. 144 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission gave greater insight through its compliance manual, which particularly
focused on how members of a board of directors and major shareholders should be
treated.145 Generally, partners, officers, members of boards of directors, or major
shareholders will not qualify as employees.146 But the determination should not be
made solely based on title. It is a consideration of whether the “individual acts
independently and participates in managing the organization, or whether the
individual is subject to another’s control.” 147 Under Delaware law, the primary
United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
CAL CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(e) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3.
142 United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979).
143 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
144 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-426).
145 U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUEL SECTION 2: THRESHOLD ISSUES
(2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-d.
146 Id
147 Id. The relevant portion of the manual states: “Factors to be considered with regard to coverage of
partners, officers, members of boards of directors, and major shareholders:
• Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and
regulations of the individuals work;
• Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work;
• Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization;
• Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in
written agreements or contracts;
• Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses and liabilities of the organization.”
Id.
140
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influence of corporate law, directors are given complete control of the business and
affairs of the corporation.148 This includes hiring officers and determining their roles.
This type of sweeping control—that is only answerable to shareholders who can
choose to not re-elect a director—is unlikely to fall under the definition of an
employee. Ultimately, even if SB-826 factually fits within a Title VII claim, which
has been previously discussed, it would not be able to be struck down on these
grounds because there is not proper coverage under the statute.
C. SB-826 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS CHARTERED
OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA
The third potential challenge SB-826 could face is that it is unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause of the United States when it is applied to corporations not
headquartered within California. SB-826 is potentially a violation because it purports
to apply to corporations with their principal executive offices in California that are
chartered outside of California. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the
power “[t]o reg late Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”149 The Clause has been held to limit the ability of states
to tax or regulate activities that will affect interstate commerce.150 SB-826 is being
applied equally to corporations chartered in California and those out-of-state, as its
enforcement hinges on the location of a corporation’s “principal executive offices.”151
The Court has also struck down state laws that are not discriminatory but unduly
burden interstate commerce.152 In Pike v. Bruce, the Court affirmed that laws that
create conflicting regulatory requirements, and even those that do not, will be struck
down if they put a burden on interstate commerce and there is not a compelling
interest. 153 SB-826 creates a conflicting regulation between what is required of
corporate boards by laws of the state of incorporation compared to what is being
mandated by California law. Therefore, SB-826 is putting a burden on interstate
commerce where its benefits do not outweigh the burdens its placing. For California,
it is unclear what the motivation would be for controlling the makeup of corporate
boards outside of the state.154 The compelling-state-interest test is the same test used

148 8 DEL. C. § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).
149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 32.
150 See Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84
HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 n.9. (1971).
151 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018).
152 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
153 Id.
154 Vikram David Amar & Jason Mazzone, Part Three on California’s Mandate that Women be Placed on
Corporate Boards: Dormant Commerce Clause and Improper Government Purpose Questions, VERDICT. (Nov.
1, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/11/01/part-three-on-californias-mandate-that-women-be-placed-oncorporate-boards.
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to determine whether a law can survive strict scrutiny in an Equal Protection
analysis.155
SB-826 advocates that the mandate is in the interest of increased corporate
performance that comes with gender balanced corporate boards. However, corporate
performance or profitability is a matter of the “business and affairs of every
corporation.”156 Delaware law sets out by statute the requirements necessary for the
size and composition of corporate boards. 157 Any further constraints are to be
included in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws. Shareholders have the
power to amend the by-laws. 158 Directors who are responsible for managing the
business and affairs of the corporation can make discretionary decisions as to what
requirements are going to be held for the board.159 Further, as previously mentioned,
the internal affairs doctrine states that the requirement of corporate boards is governed
by the corporation’s state of incorporation and not by the state in which its principal
executive offices are located.160 A board’s gender diversity is a matter of internal
corporate governance, as is shareholder voting, and SB-826 interferes with both. The
law attempts to draw a parallel to the exception that has been made for foreign
corporations under Section 2115.5(a). This argument is not compelling as Section
2115.5 includes, rather than specifically excludes, nationally traded corporations.161
California also will have an extremely difficult case as to why it is a compelling
interest of the State to be controlling the composition of other states corporate boards
of directors. In conclusion, a strong argument could be made under the Commerce
Clause alongside a Fourteenth Amendment argument for why SB-826 is
unconstitutional.
III. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES TO SB-826
The third Part of this Note will briefly discuss legal alternatives that could be
used to achieve the same goal of greater representation of women on corporate
boards. If this bill is struck down, which it likely will be, California will have to
determine different means to achieve this same end. Alternative approaches to
narrowing the gender gap on corporate boards include: (1) a tax incentive plan to
induce corporations to voluntarily end the sex disparity in exchange for a tax break,
(2) reforming SB-826 into a sunset provision encapsulated in another law so that it

Compelling-State-Interest Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8 DEL. CODE § 141(a) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04 (“The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by and under the direction of a board of
directors”).
157 8 DEL. CODE § 141(b) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04.
158 4 Harold Marsh Jr., R. Roy Finkle & Keith Paul Bishop, Marsh’s Cal. Corp. L. §5.17 (2019).
159 8 DEL. CODE § 141(a) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/.
160 Internal-Affairs Doctrine, supra note 38.
161 See generally Bishop, supra note 39.
155
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would expire in a short time period without re-approval, or (3) to allow the market to
solve the issue.
The first alternative is the most plausible and has already been implemented in
the United Kingdom with success and argued for in other scholarship.162 A voluntary
program would help to “avoid any confrontation with government regulation of the
composition of executive boards.” 163 A voluntary program would be more
comprehensive and also fall within the constitutional parameters set by affirmative
action. Such a program would have to be done on a company-by-company basis to
decide the goal number of women directors for that corporation.164 Companies opting
into this program would be required to do additional programming to facilitate the
continued success.165 The hope is that this would create a pipeline to kick-start getting
more women into executive positions going forward. Since the program would not
be permanent, it would be just a start to ending the gender gap. If the corporations
met the predetermined expectations of the program, they would also receive a tax
benefit.166 For California, this could be a great compromise. There are currently
concerns about corporations evading taxes, but here would be an opportunity for a
corporation to rightfully earn a tax break while still benefiting society at large.167 The
problem with this program is that compliance would be voluntary. There would be
no mandated participation which would take an exceptional amount of time and
resources to monitor if the program was on a personalized, company-by-company
basis. This alternative seems like it would have a high probability of success, since
it aligns with corporate incentives.
The second suggested alternative is to use a sunset provision. Sunset provisions
are “clauses embedded in legislation that allow a piece of legislation or a regulatory
board to expire on a certain date.”168 The use of a sunset provision would reform SB826 to be more in line with prior approved, constitutional precedent of temporary
measures of affirmative action. The provision would be in place for a short time
period, such as five years, until corporate boards are more representative of the
general population. It is not certain this would be an adequate amount of time to be
impactful, or that this sort of provision would be as thorough as having an entire bill
dedicated to the issue of underrepresentation. But, it would be a start to resolving the
disparity. Sunset provisions have the added benefit of creating a burden-shifting
162 See Glen, supra note 88, at 2133. See Julia Glen, Affirmative Action: The Constitutional Approach to
Ending Sex Disparities on Corporate Boards, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2089, 2133 (2017).
163 Id. at 2134.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 2134–35.
167 See e.g., Edmund DeMarche, California Democrats Want Businesses to Fork Over Half Tax-Cut
Savings to State, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/california-democrats-wantsome-businesses-to-fork-over-half-tax-cut-savings-to-state (claiming two California lawmakers introduced a
bill to make corporations return their tax benefits gained from loopholes and unconscionable tax breaks).
168 Brian Baugus and Feler Bose, Sunset Legislation in the State: Balancing the Legislature and the
Executive, MERCATUS RESEARCH, (Aug. 2005), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Baugus-SunsetLegislation.pdf.
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paradigm. Once the provision is set to expire, the burden lies on the proponents to
gain political support to reenact the law.169 This helps to reduce status quo bias for
fading political movements.170 The fact that the provision’s default is that it will
expire helps to mitigate error and reduce costs associated with reenactment or an
amendment. 171 Governor Brown, in his introduction of the bill, admitted that he
worried for the constitutionality of the bill, and said it was meant to send a message.172
There are many other platforms to send a message than to enact a law that potentially
tramples constitutional rights.173 Corporations are not the ones who should have to
pay the litigation costs to attempt to overturn this bill. Additionally, there is the added
stigma of being the organization behind attacking a bill attempting to mandate gender
equality in the workplace. The social stigma of this, plus the added time, costs, and
social criticism, could prevent organizations bringing suit, though they would have
legitimate grounds.
A final option would be to strike the law down entirely and allow time to take its
course. The bill does cite statistics that support the notion that as a society we are
moving toward more equal representation of women. 174 The increase in the
“conscious consumer” means that corporations are succumbing to social concerns in
order to increase their profits.175 Corporations are being held accountable by the
general public to heighten their diversity efforts even without the added pressure of
legislation. We are moving toward equal representation of genders on corporate
boards. But without intervention, it would take forty to fifty years to accomplish the
same goals that SB-826 could accomplish in two years. Generally, corporations try
to steer clear of greater state or federal government control and are willing to make
voluntary improvements or amendments in order to avoid interference. 176 Yet,

See Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 409, 417 (2014).
See id. at 438.
171 Id. at 420 (“A temporary constitution or constitutional provision may mitigate both error and decision
costs by increasing the quantity and quality of information available to the constitutional designers, reducing
cognitive biases, promoting consensus building, and allowing the framers to employ temporary solution to
temporary social problems.”) (citations omitted).
172 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Governor’s signing message editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3 (“I don’t
minimize the potential flaws that indeed may prove fatal to its ultimate implementation. Nevertheless, recent
events in Washington, D.C.—and beyond—make it crystal clear that many are not getting the message.”)
173 Aram, supra note 126.
174 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(f)(2) editor’s and reviser’s notes for §301.3. (“The 2017 Equilar
Gender Diversity Index (GDI) revealed that it will take nearly 40 years for the Russell 3000 companies
nationwide to reach gender parity—the year 2055.”).
175 See Jessi Baker, The Rise of the Conscious Consumer: Why Businesses Need to Open Up, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2015/apr/02/the-rise-of-theconscious-consumer-why-businesses-need-to-open-up, (arguing corporations answer to the American people
and a trend of “conscious consumption” is on the rise); see generally Susan McPherson, 8 Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) Trends to Look For In 2018, FORBES (Jan. 12 , 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanmcpherson/2018/01/12/8-corporate-social-responsibility-csr-trends-tolook-for-in-2018/#cff37fa40ce5.
176 Howard M. Metzenbaum, Legal Approaches to Corporate Governance, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 926,
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skeptics of human nature suggest that “history teaches that such voluntary reforms
are likely to be short-lived responses to passing pressures.”177 The issue is that SB826 is a well-intended piece of legislation, but it will not survive judicial challenge.
CONCLUSION
The gender imbalance in corporate boardrooms across the country is an issue. As
previously discussed, it is statistically shocking how few women actually serve in
those roles.178 SB-826 seeks to remedy a critical issue in this country in an expedited
fashion. The bill’s purpose and background are well-intentioned and rely upon
insightful studies that show greater diversity increases financial gain, creativity, and
a corporation’s overall sustainability. This bill would help to make workplace
environments safer and more successful. However, there is no statistical evidence
that greater gender balance is responsible for the increased prosperity of corporations.
Nor can we ignore the means through which gender equality is being achieved.
In sum, SB-826 is likely to face a host of constitutional challenges. Its blatant
use of a quota could not pass even a test of intermediate scrutiny. The interests at
stake here that benefit only one classification of persons do not rise to the level of a
compelling state interest. Further, the implementation of this law will create a conflict
with laws of other states and countries. California has little to no interest in dictating
the qualification that out-of-state corporations should abide by in their composition
of corporate boards. This bill could be considered an overreach of California s state
government. Additionally, it is not the corporation how should have to pay for this
law to be struck down.
What is the solution then? California is likely going to have to go back to the
drawing board and find a legal solution for this issue. This Note only briefly touched
on possible resolutions. One that has growing potential is the use of voluntary tax
benefit programs that encourage greater compliance. Though this program may be
costly, the alternative to doing nothing is to let this issue continue to resolve itself at
a sluggish pace. SB-826 is a hopeful piece of legislation, but it is not legal. The next
step is to create a more legitimate framework to carry out its well-intended purposes.
In the end, this bill can be considered beneficial from the perspective of Governor
Brown as it achieved his goal of getting politicians and other legislatures thinking
about the problem of underrepresentation and, hopefully, inventing new solutions to
tackle it.

Id.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(e)(1) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“As of June 2017,
among the 446 publicly traded companies included in the Russell 3000 index and headquartered in California,
representing nearly $5 trillion in market capitalization, women directors held 566 seats, or 15.5 percent of seats,
while men held 3,089 seats, or 84.5 percent of seats.”).
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